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informed approaches I will do so from the vista of the Newtonian-Cartesian paradigm and examine 
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emergence and consciousness with particular reference to David Bohm’s version of quantum 
mechanics. This discussion will argue for a new dialogue based around complexity theory through 
discussing (1) the inherent problems that classical mechanics reveals within its own paradigm, (2) 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to utilise developments within complexity theory to make modest 
arguments for phenomenological informed approaches in criminology (and social science more 
broadly). Following the work of Paul Cilliers (Cilliers, 1998, 2005) the term ‘modest’ describes 
“reflective positions that are careful about the reach of the claims being made and of the 
constraints that make these claims possible” (Cilliers, 2005:256). This approach is needed 
because forms of positivism (randomised controlled trials, experimental method etc) are still 
dominant in criminological research so it helps to explore the limits of those ontologies and 
epistemologies. But also despite advances in complexity theory across positivist, post-positivist 
and constructionist approaches (see e.g. Pycroft and Bartollas, 2014) there is still a tendency in 
criminology to identify complexity theory with chaos theory, which is in itself a different version of 
positivism. This gives rise to a performative contradiction (positivism offering a critique of 
positivism) which may help to explain Milovanovic’s (Milovanovic, 2013) complaint that there has 
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been a decline in receptivity and integration into criminology of complexity theory; and 
notwithstanding the fact that a decontextualized positivism cannot provide us with a meaningful 
ethic of justice. 
After relativity and quantum mechanics complexity theory has been proclaimed as the third 
revolution in human thinking but central to this discussion is the question of whether complexity 
(non-linearity, see below) is inherent within the Newtonian paradigm of classical mechanics or 
whether it represents a break from enlightenment based reductionist and positivist approaches in 
science and social science. Discussions concerning the potential for performative contradiction 
are important for criminologists because arguments for various deterministic relationships contra 
human agency within that paradigm are condiciones sine quibus non in our claims to be able to 
measure, predict and change social phenomena. To stress the point social scientists are children 
of the determinism of Newton and Descartes but the logic of these approaches lack an 
understanding or even awareness of human consciousness as a basis for human actions (see 
Milovanovic, 2014). These debates are not peculiar to complexity theory and in challenging the 
traditions of classical mechanics and asserting the importance of complexity theory in literally 
helping us to rediscover our minds and moral agency it becomes apparent that there are divisions 
and problems within the ‘house’ of complexity. Complexity theory has not fulfilled the promise of a 
unified theory, with key debates focussing on familiar arguments apropos positivism, realism and 
post-modernism concerning the establishment of laws, regularities and determinism and their 
relationships to human consciousness and agency.  In addressing these debates I will argue for a 
focus on the importance of complex adaptive systems (CAS) as a heuristic device that reveals the 
continuities and discontinuities between those differing perspectives, but furthermore for the 
concept as a locus for debate and study to allow for the possibilities of developing insights from 
apparently diverse ontological, epistemological and methodological approaches.  
To achieve this I will explore the broad parameters of the key debate concerning the reducing of 
the system to rules and laws (a process of relative disjunction) against complexity as something to 
be embraced and that is concerned with understanding things only in relation to other things (a 
3 
 
process of relative conjunction). An important focus will be on the transformational potential of 
human consciousness to overcome but importantly not deny or refute determinism within a given 
phase space. The concept of ‘gift,’ ‘given,’ ‘givenness’ is a key hermeneutical link (developed by 
Marion (Marion, 2002) building on the work of Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas) – see below) that 
adds a key ethical dimension to arguments for a relational or empathetic criminology (see e.g. 
Millie, 2016). 
 The argument will be made that evidence from within scientific method itself demonstrates that a 
unified theory of everything that allows us to identify, measure, predict and explain does not exist, 
and that increasingly post-modern and phenomenological and hermeneutically  informed 
perspectives are required to address the gaps that are left. This argument is not predicated on 
waiting for ‘science’ to catch up to prove our speculation right or wrong, but to assert that 
consciousness is itself a constituent part of the unfolding of the nature of not just social life, but 
the universe itself; as Michel Serres has argued we always dream science before actually doing it 
(see Dupuy, 2013 for a discussion of this in relation to science, religion and metaphysics). 
The modest approach in addressing these questions and making the case for phenomenological 
approaches in complexity theory is I argue from the vista of the Newtonian-Cartesian paradigm 
itself so as to examine some of the fractures that emerge from within its own logic. To make this 
case I will discuss Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems in conjunction with developments in our 
understanding of emergence, consciousness and quantum mechanics. This discussion will argue 
for a new dialogue based around complexity theory through discussing (1) the inherent problems 
that classical mechanics reveals within its own paradigm, (2) what complexity adds to these 
arguments, and (3) to suggest modestly that an increased understanding of phenomenologically 
based approaches can and should in turn inform our ethics of justice. The key assumption made 
within this paper is that criminology is fundamentally concerned with human beings who are 
biological, conscious, moral in nature and existing within evolutionary (dynamic) phase spaces. It 
is hoped that this discussion will enable us to understand some of the differences and 
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commonalities in the study of complexity, and hopefully provide for fruitful discussion and dialogue 
to move this relatively youthful area of study forward. 
Complexity theory 
Whatever our view of complexity e.g. a problem to be solved or something to be embraced it is 
ubiquitous and  in reality simple systems do not exist even in so called ‘simple life forms’ (see 
Ochman and Raghavan, 2009). In the words of Jaques Derrida  
“One shouldn’t complicate things for the pleasure of complicating, but one should also never 
simplify or pretend to be sure of such simplicity where there is none. If things were simple, word 
would have gotten round...” (Derrida, 1988:119).  
Complexity theory is the study of non-linear dynamical systems (NDS) and the understanding that 
changes within a system is not necessarily proportional to inputs. In developing innovative 
solutions to social problems complexity theory challenges the reductionism inherent in cause and 
effect approaches that have dominated western thought predicated upon the Platonic-Cartesian-
Newtonian traditions in science and social science. It is argued by Bar-Yam (Bar-Yam, 1997:5) that: 
 “The study of complex systems in a unified framework has become recognized…as a new scientific 
discipline, the ultimate of interdisciplinary fields…strongly rooted in the advances that have been 
made in diverse fields ranging from physics to anthropology, from which it draws inspiration and 
to which it is relevant.”   
However in practice despite early aspirations complexity theory has not provided a unifying 
framework and splits along traditional positivist, post positivist (realist) and post-modern 
(constructivist) perspectives (see Pycroft and Bartollas, 2014). To conceptualise these 
developments Morin’s (2005) categories of ‘restricted’ and ‘general’ complexity are useful. The 
former refers to the type of complex systems theory, mathematically based that has developed 
from rather than representing a break from the Newtonian paradigm of classical mechanics; the 
latter challenges an implicit reductionism in establishing rules and regularities that is inherent in 
the restricted paradigm by arguing for open systems and a principle of conjunction rather than 
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disjunction and is therefore more concerned with the relationships between the parts and the 
whole. Byrne in advocating general complexity (1997:2) states  
“that we now have available an account of dynamics which centres on non-linear changes in the 
properties of systems as a whole rather than the linear trajectories of the elements which are 
located within those systems…we should replace mechanics with thermodynamics as our central 
analogy…systems are inherently evolutionary and…changes over time are not reversible…systems 
are essentially historical.”  
An important question of self-reflexivity for complexity theorists who are embedded in the systems 
they study is whether higher order solutions (solutions which transcend independent disjointed 
and static categories within the system) can be found within the subject itself to avoid polarisation, 
fragmentation and reductionism and whether we can move out of silo based thinking that has 
historically been a consequence of Cartesian ‘ghost in the machine’ dualism. It is argued for 
example by Mikulecky (2001) that in the ‘natural sciences’, and through the analogy of the 
machine, Cartesian reductionism (in the form of Randomized Controlled Trials and experimental 
methods for example) does not work in making models of complex systems because it merely 
reduces them to an aspect of the overall system. In these methodologies by reducing the 
complexity through abstracting from the whole to understand it, we cannot understand it because 
we only have a part and not the whole. This is a major paradox that runs throughout the study of 
complexity and with respect to criminology provides arguments for relational understandings of 
justice. 
Complex Adaptive Systems 
It is useful to think of the term ‘Complex Adaptive System’ as a heuristic metaphor1 that helps us 
to understand behaviours of multi-agented systems, made up of multiple interacting elements. 
This use of metaphor is useful in providing epistemic access to dynamic systems and not only fits 
                                                          
1 I refer to metaphor as a practical modelling device rather than making any clear statement about 
isormorphism. The former is figurative whereas the latter is literal. The relationship between the two is 
ambiguous (see Paniagua, 1982) and for the purposes of my argumentrelates to the problem of epistemic 
fallacy (see below). 
6 
 
with the mathematical nominalism of Bishop Berkeley who saw mathematical symbols as a kind 
of linguistic convention (see Avigad, 2007) but also post-modernist perspectives on the reflexivity 
of language and the ways in which it is essentially a local phenomenon which has   validity in a 
certain time and space (see Cilliers, 1998). The use of metaphor is argued for example by Proctor 
and Larsson (2005:1065): 
“It may be helpful to consider complexity, and related terms such as "self-organization," as recent 
metaphors deployed to advance knowledge on fundamental questions…including the relationship 
between parts and wholes, and between order and disorder. Though not commonly viewed as 
such, metaphors are an indispensable component of science, and should not be appraised as true 
or false, but rather in terms of how they help or hinder knowledge. By understanding metaphor as 
a necessary ally and not a threat to…knowledge, we may enrich our contextual understanding of 
complexity while continuing to invoke it in useful ways.” 
The use of metaphor as mental models then allows us to engage in a rich and deep interpretation 
of the world, whilst acknowledging that we can only ever have a partial picture of “reality.” 
Mikulecky (Mikulecky, 2001) reminds us that through observing the world around us and using 
mental activity to make sense of and interpret sensory information this ‘modeling relation’, argues 
that the ‘natural system’ and the events of causality are our objects of study, which we then, 
however, translate or encode into another system that we cognitively construct and call a ‘formal 
system’. We then use this system in various ways to identify and copy the changes in the natural 
system. The real world is complex, and critically, the modeling relation is forgotten because the 
formal system has become reality. This is an example of epistemic or ontic fallacy, with the model 
being seen as reality rather than the reality itself.  
The Newtonian paradigm views the universe as complicated and acting essentially like clockwork 
(making model building a reasonable option) whereas the distinction between complicated and 
complex is fundamental to understanding the nature of complexity theory. CAS allow us to 
distinguish with clarity the differences between systems that are complicated and those that are 
complex. Pycroft, (2014:21) makes the following distinction: 
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 “Merely (but, nonetheless, often impressively) ‘complicated’ engines, for example, are 
complicated in that they can be understood by identifying and describing their component parts, 
which follow a linear process from ignition through to cruise control; however, complex systems 
and the interaction between the component parts and their openness to their environments mean 
that they cannot be fully understood by identifying their components (see Cilliers, 1998), making 
it very difficult to predict how they will act…In this sense, complicated systems are actually quite 
simple once you understand how they work and you have a manual that describes their 
interactions.” 
Within differing perspectives on complexity theory there is some consensus about the key features 
of CAS (see Byrne, 1998; Cilliers, 1998; Morçöl, 2012; Byrne and Callaghan, 2013; Wolf-Branigin, 
2013) which allows a focus for debate (see Pycroft and Wolf-Branigin, 2015 for this application to 
social work). The properties of CAS are as follows: 
• CAS have multiple elements, and the larger the number of elements the more difficult and 
impractical it becomes to analyse and describe the system mathematically due to 
emergent behaviour which makes the system more than the sum of its parts.  
• CAS are capable of learning and change and emergent properties may arise through the 
lower-level interactions between agents and such properties cannot be understood at the 
level of the agents themselves. This becomes the focus for a whole systems approach 
which looks at the behaviour of the overall system and the ways in which component parts 
however small have the potential to change the behaviour of the whole. 
• CAS are evolutionary in nature and there is no guiding hand or template for their 
development rather they develop through a process of ‘order for free’ and as per 
evolutionary processes some systems achieve equilibrium, some exist on ‘the edge of 
chaos’, some are chaotic and some eventually die; with some systems cycling through all 
or some of these stages determined by their attractor states. 
•  An attractor (see Guastello and Liebovitch, 2009 for a full discussion) is a space in which 
movement can take place or not; it effectively acts like a magnet to attract other objects 
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into its basin unless they have sufficient energy to move away. Attractors are stable 
structures because all of the points within it follow the same rules of motion and different 
attractors determine different types of motion: fixed point (gravitation towards an 
epicentre), limit cycle (a cyclical orbit), toroidal (is a limit cycle that travels along two axes 
rather than one and becomes unpredictable) and strange/chaotic (within a bounded space 
there are  high levels of unpredictability and sensitivity to initial conditions meaning that 
small changes within the motion of the attractor can have a big effect). As well as attractors 
there are also repellors which as the name suggests has the opposite effect by deflecting 
objects away from the epicentre often in an unstable manner. Importantly within attractor 
states bifurcations can be created which bring instability through a system attaining more 
complexity by accessing new dynamical states. 
• The interaction of these elements is then dynamic and changes over time; CAS have a 
history and because of the arrow of time are non-reversible (classical mechanics assumes 
reversibility). 
• The exact behaviour of the system is not quantifiable to the precise amount of interactions 
allocated to individual elements. The different elements in the system can be connected 
to a greater or lesser degree but still have significant impact on the overall behaviour of 
the system. 
• These interactions can be non-linear in nature in so far as their behaviour is not necessarily 
proportionate to inputs into the system; this behaviour defines the behaviours of complex 
systems. 
• Complex systems are open systems that interact with their environments and are usually 
nested within other systems, and also made up of sub systems, making the boundaries of 
the system unclear. The elements in a system mediate the environmental impact on that 
system to either strengthen or weaken the impact, with output from one system/sub 
system providing the input for another 
• The interaction of the elements can create negative and positive feedback loops that either 
dampen or stimulate the system. Importantly, the system can adapt to changes in the 
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internal and external environment and there is an overlap between subcategories and 
because of this connectivity, the existence of fuzzy boundaries and overlap, it is difficult to 
simply remove a part of the system and to replace it; the system has a history, which 
determines its current structure, internal organisation and behavior; this is known as 
sensitivity to initial conditions. 
Addiction for example is best understood as a complex adaptive system (see Pycroft, 2010, 2015) 
which is highly deterministic with the real possibility of a spiraling down leading to entrenched and 
socially exclusionary factors. These deterministic factors cover a range of biological, psychological 
and social issues which can become “locked in” with the system having an ability to accommodate 
perturbations such as treatment interventions which poses significant challenges to interventions 
and their necessity of being as dynamic as the problems they are trying to solve. Some of these 
factors are changes in the cortico-mesolimbic dopamine system (CMDA) which distorts the brain’s 
reward system that gives us motivation in the evolutionary environment leading to compulsion; 
drug seeking is initiated outside of consciousness; addiction is 50% heritable; most people with 
addictions have other psychiatric disorders as well and addiction is a chronic relapsing condition 
in the majority of people who seek help (Sellman, 2009).  In addition we know that drug use and 
particularly deaths from drug use are linked to social characteristics such as being male, young, 
unemployment, having lower educational achievement, being unmarried, from lower socio 
economic status, experience of family conflict, parents with positive attitudes towards drug use 
and overall experiencing individual, family and community disadvantage (Darke, et al 2007). The 
challenge is to find solutions to address these apparently intractable problems. 
 
However CAS are by nature adaptive, transformational and unpredictable, with random (chaotic) 
behaviour occurring as a result of rather than as an exception to deterministic rules. The 
evolutionary nature of these systems means that over time they are able to respond to both internal 
and external forces leading to indeterminate change. This means that from the complexity 
perspective and to move beyond the positivist paradigm we need to address the problem of 
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structural determinism that is left unresolved within the Cartesian approach and its implication for 
ethics 
Classical Determinism and complexity 
Within positivist and post positivist (realist) approaches to complexity there is a focus on 
determinism, formal rules and regularities that give rise to complexity and which are encapsulated 
in the concepts of sensitivity to initial conditions and attractor states. All of these systems can 
theoretically be mapped mathematically and based upon axiomatic principles. There are however 
(at least) two problems with these approaches; firstly the limitations of establishing universal and 
deterministic laws of mathematics and logic as identified by Kurt Gödel and secondly the role of 
human consciousness within mathematical models. I want to briefly address the first point and 
then address the second by reviewing important developments in the relationships between 
quantum mechanics, biological life and human consciousness.  
The positivist and post-positivist (realist) argument is that not only does the universe appear to 
work with a remarkable degree of regularity but it is precisely this determinism which allows us to 
measure and to some extent predict future behaviour of systems and the properties of those 
systems. To a large degree positivism and the reification of science would seem to be largely 
justified in this approach; completing the periodic table, establishing a standard models of physics 
and cosmology that are able to predict the existence of the Higgs-Boson particle or quantum gravity 
and then to find to find the evidence for them are remarkable. This would seem to suggest that we 
are on our way to discovering a complete theory of everything that exists or is derived from a 
Platonic realm of ideal mathematical models. Determinism and therefore measurability and 
predictability are akin to Leibniz’s Calculus Ratiocinator (Peckhaus, 2009) whereby algorithms and 
formulae can be applied to rules and statements to determine whether they are true or not. 
However to demonstrate the limits to mathematical models and rule based systems we can use 
two well-known examples; firstly Newton’s ‘Three body problem’ and secondly Bertrand Russell’s 
Barber’s Paradox. In the first example it is very straightforward to predict the elliptical orbit of one 
planet around the sun, but as soon as another planet is introduced exact prediction becomes 
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impossible due to deterministic chaos brought about by arbitrarily small changes in position and 
velocity. The system is deterministic but it is inherently unpredictable (Jennings, 2014).  
The second example is as follows: 
“Suppose you walk past a barber's shop one day, and see a sign that says 
"Do you shave yourself? If not, come in and I'll shave you! I shave anyone who does not shave 
himself, and no one else." 
This seems fair enough, and fairly simple, until, a little later, the following question occurs to you - 
does the barber shave himself? If he does, then he mustn't, because he doesn't shave men who 
shave themselves, but then he doesn't, so he must, because he shaves every man who doesn't 
shave himself... and so on. Both possibilities lead to a contradiction.” 
(https://plus.maths.org/content/mathematical-mysteries-barbers-paradox)  
This paradox challenged so called “naïve” set theory which argues that any clearly phrased 
condition defines a set; that is the set is made up of all things that satisfy the condition. Clearly 
according to the paradox some sets are not members of themselves and appears to conform to 
the Law of the Excluded Middle; within standard logic if A is true, then B is false (and vice versa) 
with the excluded middle stating that both A and B are true, which is an apparently contradictory 
statement (The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics appears to conform to the Law 
of the Excluded Middle (see below) with the famous Schrödinger’s Cat thought experiment used by 
Schrödinger himself to demonstrate the absurd consequences of the Copenhagen version of 
quantum mechanics when you have a cat that is both dead and alive (see Gribben, 1994) ).  
The problem of whether any coherent condition could determine a set was addressed by Gödel’s 
Incompleteness Theorems (see Raatikainen, (2015). These theorems demonstrate that it is not 
possible to find a complete and axiomatic set across all mathematics. The first theorem states that 
within a mathematical system it is not possible to find a system that is capable of proving all truths 
about the relationships of the numbers within that system: There must be statements about 
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natural numbers that are true but are not provable within the system. The second theorem states 
that such a system cannot demonstrate its own consistency. 
The findings of Gödel have been nothing short of revolutionary in mathematics and beyond and 
has led to the view that a complete theory of the universe is not possible; in part due to our lack of 
overall observer status (e.g. a rejection of the 19th Century’s Pierre-Simon Laplace’s positivist 
conceit of the Daemon; the intellect that could know all past events, predict all future events and 
understand any composite entity through a process of atomising the constituent parts), thus our 
systems are always self-referential, but also because as Gödel demonstrates it is not possible to 
formulate a theory of the universe in a finite number of statements 
(http://www.hawking.org.uk/godel-and-the-end-of-physics.html).   
 Positionality (as demonstrated by Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (albeit the laws of physics remain 
constant)) and the subjective nature of experience is identified as significant within mathematics 
and physics as well as post-modern thought with for example Paul Cilliers seeking to avoid an 
approach to complexity theory that is purely relativistic but arguing that ‘it is not possible to tell a 
single and exclusive story about something that is really complex’ (Cilliers, 1998: viii). For Cilliers 
it is far more important to think in terms of relationships between the parts of a system and its 
whole rather than deterministic rules. This is because of the significance of the observer within the 
system which is open, and has unclear boundaries which in themselves should not be confused 
with the limit or influence of the system; that the diversity of the system is  the best resource for 
understanding the system rather than a reduction to component parts; significantly self-
organisation and social construction undermine the concept of self-contained atomised subjects; 
and because we do not have neutral observer status we have to make choices and engage in 
normative considerations. Cilliers (1998: 35) in arguing for connectionist rather than 
representational models looks to quantum mechanics and the relational descriptions of sub 
atomic particles and argues that ‘The significance of each atom is … not determined by its basic 
nature, but is a result of a large number of relationships between itself and other atoms’  
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Gödel’s mathematics is inherently complex and reveals the limitations of classical mechanics and 
knowledge. In addressing these ‘problems’ his philosophy is also complex in which he defended 
both the rationalist idea that mathematics is a description of Platonic objective reality and the 
realist concept of the impossibility of interpreting empirical laws due to the fact that our sense data 
are bound up with the conditions under which they are experienced. This gives rise to the 
fascinating tension that the objective platonic realm exists but we do not have access to it. This 
means that no correspondence or verification about those conditions and the statements that we 
want to prove can be made. To try to overcome this dualism Gödel looked to phenomenology, and 
stated as follows: 
…there exists today the beginning of a science which claims to possess a systematic method for 
such a clarification in meaning, and this is the phenomenology founded by Husserl. Here 
clarification of meaning consists in focussing more sharply on the concepts concerned by directing 
our attention in a certain way, namely onto our own acts in the use of these concepts, onto our 
own powers in carrying out our acts, etc. But one must keep in mind that this phenomenology is 
not a science in the same sense as other sciences. Rather it is (or in any case should be) a 
procedure or technique that should produce in us a new state of consciousness in which we 
describe in detail the basic concepts we use in our thought, or grasp other basic concepts 
unknown to us. I believe there is no reason at all to reject such a procedure at the outset as 
hopeless…not only is there no reason for the rejection (of phenomenology), but on the contrary 
one can present reasons in its favour (Gödel, 1995: 383 cited in 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel/goedel-phenomenology.html ). 
Consciousness and human agency 
Husserlian phenomenology argues that reality and its objects are constituted by consciousness 
and are immanent in and inseparable from consciousness (Morçöl, 2012). This mitigates against 
the possibility of objective knowledge. In this approach our consciousness structures what we 
experience on the basis of previous experiences and the context of our current experience. In 
discussing the ways in which our consciousness constructs reality Polizzi (Polizzi, 2016) for 
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example considers the fatal shooting of black teenager Trayvon Martin by Neighborhood Watch 
Volunteer George Zimmerman. In this situation Zimmerman’s understanding of the world was  
“…framed by a set of contextually situated taken-for-granted expectations that are constructed or 
recognized as being most consistent or normal to that locality.” (Polizzi, 2016:30).  
In this case Polizzi argues that within all the accounts provided of this shooting no one questioned 
the basic rationale that was constructed of Martin being dangerous and criminal given that he was 
a black teenager and was present in that particular neighbourhood.  
A key question for criminal justice and ideals of rehabilitation is whether change is possible for the 
individual perpetrator. There are no guarantees of this even in repeat encounters and again this 
uncertainty is a feature of complexity theory.  In respect of knowledge based on previous 
experience Husserl uses the terms “Noesis” and “Noema” with the former referring to the act of 
apprehending an object and the latter the object that is apprehended. Within this approach there 
is an “I-pole” and an “object-pole” that allows for consciousness of something (see Rassi and 
Shahabi, 2015). However Morçöl (Morçöl, 2012) argues that whilst this may resemble for example 
Kant’s synthetic a priori they are far more malleable than Kant’s fixed categories in that the knower 
can change his/her world view based upon experience.  It is argued by Needs and Adair-Stantiall 
(Needs and Adair-Stantiall, 2017:35) that not only is this capacity for adaptive change essentially 
characteristic of social systems but that  
“ The boundaried network of mutually generating and sustaining processes that comprise a system 
ensures its continued self-generation and self-organisation; interactions with other systems are 
necessary for its growth, learning and survival…” 
They further argue that to allow for the emergence of a coherent self (a viable agent) within complex 
systems that a person needs a sense of distinctiveness through time (autonomy within 
connectedness) that provides viability and continuity. What complexity theory shows us is that this 
change is only made possible through the evolutionary nature of the arrow of time which allows for 
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the development of new phenomena (see Priogogine and Stengers, 1997) but that a sensitivity to 
initial conditions is also a real possibility. 
In examining the relationships between quantum mechanics and human agency, choice and 
freewill it is important to follow the logic of naturalised phenomenology. An utilisation of the power 
of quantum mechanics has transformed the world with respect to finance, the global economy, 
computing and digital innovations, but the implications of an understanding of the quantum level 
have yet to inform our understanding of human agency (see Bartollas, 2014). This is because (1) 
to have a unified theory of everything we need to have an agreed theory of consciousness but we 
do not know what consciousness is; (2) but we can say that the Cartesian ‘Ghost in the machine’ 
approach splitting the universe between thinking substances (res cogitans) and the mechanical 
world (res extensa) does not help to solve the problem of the structure-agency divide; (3) quantum 
level indeterminacy looks, and is weird in comparison with classical physics, with Einstein famously 
questioning whether God plays dice with respect to the indeterminacy of the Copenhagen 
Interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
The quantum level is not only where ‘consciousness’ meets potential ‘structure’, but is from where 
reality emerges into the realm of classical physics and is therefore an essential area for discussion, 
theorising and exploration for social scientists. Some of the most recent work on complexity, 
phenomenology and quantum mechanics has arisen in the domain of evolutionary biology. Whilst 
complexity might seem an intuitively reasonable approach (for example in the study of eco 
systems) quantum mechanics has long been seen as being unrelated to biology (Arndt, Juffman 
and Vedral, 2009) (and even more so, social science); but also attempts to ‘naturalize’ 
phenomenology have challenged Cartesian dualism and scientific method. In developing this area 
of study Kauffman and Gare (2015), Pylkkänen (2015) and Longo, Montévil and Kauffman (2012) 
combine their work with postmodern philosophical insights to help explain complex evolutionary 
processes, and enhance our understanding of consciousness and social life.  
Pylkkänen (2015) points out that despite the philosophically radical implications of quantum 
theory and relativity there has been little discussion of this in the phenomenological literature 
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despite for example Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with physics and Heidegger’s discussions with 
Heisenberg. Quantum mechanics seems to provide another fracture in the Newtonian paradigm 
given that for example the decay of radioactive atoms takes place randomly; that the position and 
momentum of a quantum system cannot be measured at the same time; and the ‘double-slit 
experiment’ demonstrating that light and matter exist in a state of superposition whereby they exist 
simultaneously as waves and particles (see below). The implications of this are profound as: 
“…Evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a 
single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the 
phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects.” (Bohm, 1949 cited in 
Pylkkänen, 2015:8). 
When it comes to predicting human behaviour the brain as the most complex system that we know 
of simply has far too many particles to make this mathematically possible. But Longo, Montévil and 
Kauffman (2012) also argue that the strong determinism (my emphasis to stress that this is not a 
complete absence of determinism) and hence reductionism of the Newtonian paradigm of physics 
breaks down when explaining the evolution of the biosphere (and by extension features such as 
the human brain); it has come into existence without an entailing law, moreover given this is the 
case then no such law is necessary for such extraordinary complexity to arise and thrive. The key 
points of their arguments are as follows: 
• In physics we can not only pre-state the phase space (trajectory) of a given system, but the 
dynamics of that system are measurable. 
• In biological evolution the phase space changes persistently and in ways that cannot be 
pre-stated or predicted. 
• Due to not being able to pre-state the changing phase space of biological evolution we 
cannot clearly identify the boundary conditions or the relevant observables and parameters 
to be measured. 
• If this is true then no law entails the evolution of the biosphere 
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• If we understand ‘cause’ as that which gives a differential effect, entailed by law then we 
can assign no cause in the evolutionary changes within the biosphere. 
• Rather than ‘cause’ the authors use the concept of ‘enablement’, of making possible. 
• Importantly their thesis does not take away the need for reductive explanations of 
organisms existing as whole at a given point in time to explain a physical account of 
behaviour once evolved; for example organs of the body such as a heart (see the discussion 
on David Bohm’s work below with respect to explicate order). 
Strange attractors 
A strange attractor is one in which patterns and regularities do exist in the phase space, but the 
system never follows the same trajectory (see Pycroft, 2014a). There are processes of both 
expansion and contraction and the chaotic motion operates in more than one dimension. There is 
order and control although each order parameter is affected by the behaviour of other order 
parameters. These attractors are prone to bifurcate, that is become increasingly complex by 
accessing new dynamical states in their environment; this is effect and effect rather than cause 
and effect. In addition the sub systems of a strange attractor may exist as strange attractors or as 
other types of attractor in conjunction with each other. This makes the evolution of the whole 
system and its trajectories fundamentally uncertain.  
Complexity theory is fundamentally concerned with the concept of multiplicity apropos multi-
agented systems, and the need for a whole systems perspsective. In phenomenology Husserl sees 
multiplicity related to a unified consciousness (see Gödel above) and by Bergsonism which differs 
by arguing that consciousness is not of something, but rather in something2 (Milovanovic, 2014). 
The process philosophy of Bergson and the development of his concept of time and consciousness 
as la durée, or ‘duration’ (Bergson, 1988) are useful in our approach to understand connectionist 
complex systems as examples of strange attractors. Within la durée Bergson differentiates 
                                                          
2 Bergson’s philosophy was an attempt to overcome Kantian antinomies by asserting the possibility of absolute 
knowledge. My position is that Gödel should be the starting point in this debate. Moreover it is not the 
intention of this paper to examine the debates between differing schools of phenomenology. Bergson 
represents a distaff tradition seeking to integrate both analytic and phenomenological approaches (see 
Hodges, 2008). 
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between quantitative (discrete) and qualitative (continuous) multiplicities. These differences are 
described by Hodges (Hodges, 2008: 409) as follows: 
Quantitative multiplicities are numerical in nature, and take the form of the one and the many: 
their chief differences are homogeneous differences of degree (emphasis retained), and such 
multiplicities can therefore be divided without occasioning a difference in kind. Qualitative 
multiplicities, by contrast, on division create heterogeneous differences…they comprise an 
interrelated (i.e. relational) infinite whole, where any multiple is fused with all other multiples and 
any one cannot either be isolated or change without all others changing… 
Strange attractors are examples of qualitative and quantitative multiplicities, containing infinite 
possibilities that are not foreseeable, with the realisation of the possible only existing in retrospect. 
This then allows for understanding the divergence and convergence and complexity of human lived 
experience grounded in la durée of relational time. Importantly within Bergsonism we can 
platonically reconstitute the subject of our study after the event, but this does not give us the thing 
itself. According to Bergson we have to engage in a process of intuition that allows us to enter into 
the thing that will allow for absolute knowledge. However in line with Gödel we have to say that this 
absolute knowledge is not possible as intuition (to be understood as self-sympathy and empathy 
for the other) only gives us knowledge of la durée as a contracted part of the whole, but 
nonetheless is related to the whole, and it’s becoming3. Within Bergson’s approach “there is no 
direction in which flux or process is moving, and there is no one river of time that flows” (Hodges, 
2008:415) which would appear to be consistent with Einstein’s theory of relativity but again the 
dynamics of the system are relative to the arrow of time as a quantitative multiplicity; evolution is 
not reversible. 
Longo, Montévil and Kauffman’s (Longo, Montévil and Kauffman 2012) are effectively using the 
concept of strange attractors to underpin the uncertainty and non-linearity of biological processes, 
                                                          
3 This becoming is linked with different phase spaces relative to energy and the arrow of time e.g. chaos, edge 
of chaos, equilibrium and entropy (the third law of thermodynamics states that absolute entropy is not 
possible). 
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and by extension the nature of evolutionary and social life. The concept of strange attractors is 
evident in the work of Deleuze and Guattari (as a development of Bergson) (see Massumi, 1996) 
and I am arguing that this concept is essential in our understanding of whole systems approaches 
to understanding social life. I would also suggest that all social phenomena as CAS exist in a 
strange attractor state, and it is to this concept that we need to look to in finding a common 
language that allows for the development of complexity theory. This language in itself needs to try 
and not reduce complexity to one perspective but to reflect the evolutionary becoming that is the 
social world.  
This is self-evidently not straight forward but we can construct an argument supporting naturalised 
phenomenological approaches based around Longo, Montévil and Kauffman’s work and the 
quantum mechanics of David Bohm. 
Longo, Montévil and Kauffman (Longo, Montévil and Kauffman 2012:2) argue for cells and 
organisms as Kantian wholes which they define thus: 
 “the whole exists for and by means of the parts, and the parts for and by means of the 
whole…Kantian wholes married to self-reproduction and Darwinian evolution are part of the non-
ergodic, historical becoming of the Universe, and, we claim beyond entailing law. A deep aspect of 
the freedom from entailing law in the evolution of organisms is that the possible ‘uses’ of a given 
part or process of an organism are, both indefinite and un-orderable, in our views, thus a fortiori, 
no effective procedure or algorithm can list them.”  
They argue that new parts, processes and adaptations and Darwinian pre-adaptations arise all the 
time often caused by quantum indeterminate, acausal, random mutations, develop uses and novel 
functions as parts of the organism and become a part of it within the un-prestatable selective 
environment. It is only by looking at the whole that the features of a new niche are revealed 
demonstrating that the organism and its niche are co-constituted in a circular way that cannot pre-
stated. For Longo, Montévil and Kauffman (Longo, Montévil and Kauffman, 2012) evolution 
represents radical emergence, from life to life whereby that evolution creates, without selection 
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acting to do so new adjacent possible empty niches thus enabling possible new evolutionary 
directions; again due to sequences of quantum events at the molecular level which are acausal. 
Thus the niche is not causal but enabling of radical emergence meaning that “If correct, 
reductionism reaches a terminus at the watershed of life.” (Page 3). They argue that within this 
post entailing law explanatory framework new Actuals constituting boundary situations evolve and 
that allow for historical evolution but in a process of persistent becoming.  
This analysis gives us a powerfully new understanding of the fluidity of attractor states, and the 
transfer of energy within and between systems; however we still need to address the problem of 
human consciousness and agency, and the question of whether this can be rescued from both 
Cartesian and biological determinism. Central to these discussions is the notion of the ‘arrow of 
time’ and non-reversibility as essential components of CAS. However there are three arrows of 
time; thermodynamic, psychological and cosmological (Hawking, 1988) with complexity having 
focussed on thermodynamics and the transfer of energy between systems, and the movement 
towards cycles of entropy and disorder (driven by attractor states). The psychological arrow is how 
we subjectively experience time and why we remember the past and not the future and is 
inextricably linked with thermodynamics. The cosmological arrow of time indicates an expanding 
rather than contracting universe. Hawking (Hawking, 1988) argues that all three arrows need to 
be pointing in the same direction to allow for the creation of intelligible life, indicating a high level 
of determinism. 
It is argued by Kauffman and Gare (2015) and also Milovanovic (Milovanovic, 2013, 2014) that 
we need to do quantum mechanics to break the Cartesian problem of the human brain and mind 
having no real purpose within a closed and deterministic universe. In progressing from the vista of 
classical mechanics it is not clear what the relationship is between the quantum and the classical 
physical world and what the limits of each are, and how consciousness is related to these. In the 
quantum world there is no chaos only regularities and the explanation for the existence of chaos 
(and by extension complexity) in the physical world is the size and mass of systems, which cannot 
be disaggregated from their environments and also quantum decoherence (Berry, 1989). Quantum 
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decoherence functions to bring a system into a classical state whereas previously it has existed in 
a state of superposition (e.g. existing as both wave and particle until following observation there is 
a collapse of the wave function into or the other).  
This brings us to a key debate in quantum mechanics with respect to the Copenhagen and the de 
Broglie-Bohm interpretations and for our purposes the relevance to criminology and social 
research. In the development of a quantum holographic approach to criminology the work of 
Dragan Milovanovic (Milovanovic, 2013, 20144) has been ground breaking and provocative. In 
assessing the status of that work then the review by Raymond Bradley (Bradley, 2015) a pioneer 
of quantum holography has been useful and helps to understand the complexities of this important 
field and to seek to develop it further. In his review Bradley highlights some issues with 
Milovanovic’s concept, two of which are pertinent to my argument: Firstly he points out that 
quantum holography is not a branch of quantum physics as implied by Milovanovic; secondly he 
has reservations about Milovanovic’s use of the concept of the ‘collapse of the wave function.’ 
Both of these issues are linked and stem from Milovanovic’s reliance on the Copenhagen version 
of quantum mechanics (for which he states (Milovanovic, 2013) that there is the most evidence. 
Bradley (Bradley, 2015) argues firstly that quantum holography has much wider scope than 
quantum physics as it applies to the macro as well as micro (quantum) worlds for which it can 
completely and accurately measure communication of energetically encoded information but 
secondly that human consciousness cannot be reduced to quantum physics vis a vis the collapse 
of the wave function. I would argue with respect to understanding the relationships between 
consciousness and matter the de Broglie-Bohm approach to quantum physics may be more helpful 
to our understanding of consciousness in something rather than of something and is of particular 
relevance to complexity theory, as it gives back reality itself in the form of objectivity, patterns and 
regularities in the phase space of any given system. 
                                                          
4 In his work Milovanovic rightly and courageously seeks to introduce the concept of the meaningful subject 
into criminology through the development of Schema QD. The  intra and inter construction of the subject is an 
essential area for development in social science and complexity theory adds to this debate. 
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 The key to Bohm’s argument is; 
“…the notion of the enfolded or implicate order. The essential feature of this idea… (is)…that the 
whole universe is in some way enfolded in everything and that each thing is enfolded in the whole. 
From this it follows in some way, and to some degree everything enfolds or implicates everything, 
but in such a manner that under typical conditions of ordinary experience, there is a great deal of 
relative independence of things. The basic proposal then is that this enfoldment relationship 
(emphasis retained) is not merely passive or superficial. Rather it is active and essential to what 
each thing is. It follows that each thing is internally related to the whole, and therefore to everything 
else. The external relationships (emphasis retained) are then displayed in the unfolded or 
implicate order in which each thing is seen, as has already been indicated, as relatively separate 
and extended, and related only externally to other things. The explicate order, which dominates 
ordinary experiences as well as classical (Newtonian) physics, thus appears to stand by itself. But 
actually it cannot be understood properly apart from its ground in the primary reality of the 
implicate order. Because the implicate order is not static but basically dynamic in nature, in a 
constant process of change and development, I called its most general form the holomovement. 
All things found in the unfolded, explicate order emerge from the holomovement in which they are 
enfolded as potentialities and ultimately fall back into it. They endure only for some time, and while 
they last, their existence is sustained in a constant process of unfoldment and re-enfoldment, 
which gives rise to their relative stable and independent forms in the explicate order” (Bohm, 
1990:3). 
Within Newtonian/Cartesian dualism there is the assumption that matter occupies discrete space 
whereas mind does not. Quantum mechanics challenges that assumption with Bohm’s theory 
developing the argument that the particles of physics have primitive mind like qualities thus it is 
not possible to make an absolute distinction between mind and matter. In developing accounts of 
reality that correspond to contextual, qualitative and connectionist models (contra independent, 
quantitative and representational models) then Bohmian theory offers real potential. He argues 
(see Bohm, 1980; Bohm and Hiley, 1987 and Bohm, 1990) that particles do follow a well-defined 
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trajectory but that it is always accompanied by a new kind of quantum field. In physics these 
quantum fields can be represented as potentials which describe a field as a potentiality, present 
at each point of space acting on a particle which is at that point. In Newtonian physics the effect is 
always proportional to the intensity of the field, but in Bohm’s theory the quantum potential is 
dependent only on the form and not the intensity of the quantum field; consequently even a weak 
field can strongly affect the particle as can distant environmental factors. This affect from a 
distance (non-locality) is new, and reintroduces determinism (contra indeterminism) into quantum 
theory. For Bohm (1990) the key element in understanding this non localism is the notion of active 
communication which puts form into the energy (quantum potential) that the particle has. Crucially 
it is the active communication from within the whole system (quantum field) that gives shape and 
form to the particle. The ways in which these particles interact is dependent upon the pool of 
information within the whole system but in ways that cannot be pre-assigned. The quantum 
potential for a whole system is then non-local and brings about order or form (or ‘emergence’ to 
use the language of complexity theory). 
With respect to what we experience in the classical world of physics as opposed to quantum level 
behaviour Bohm (Bohm, 1990) argues for wholeness at the quantum level and objective 
significance. He argues that active information is the rudimentary mind like behaviour of matter, 
given that the essential quality of mind is the activity of form rather than substance. In this theory 
active information is both physical and mental in nature in a relationship that continues to exist at 
infinite levels of subtlety, and our consciousness and thought forms are present at the quantum 
level. The implications of this approach are profound in which there is no division between mind, 
matter and consciousness with our whole beings engaging in a “a flux of fundamental 
participation” (Bohm, 1990: 9). Bohm (Bohm, 1990) argues that both ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ serve 
only as terms for analysis, which help us to understand things, but cannot be seen as separate 
substances in interaction with each other, or reduced to serve as a function of the other. 
An important contribution to this argument is the work of Penrose and Hameroff (see for example 
Hameroff, 2012) on the human brain, quantum biology and the rescuing of the concepts of free 
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will and agency from the Cartesian tradition. Their arguments for quantum brain biology address 
the deterministic problems of (1) reducing consciousness and causal agency to neurobiological 
mechanisms, and (2) that our perceptions which occur after an event are too late for us to respond 
meaningfully to them (e.g. top tennis players respond to a served ball travelling at 120 MPH before 
they are aware of the need to act);. Penrose and Hameroff present a theory of Orchestrated 
Objective Reduction (Orch OR) in which moments of conscious choice are experienced as a 
collapse of the quantum wave function in microtubules inside neurons. These microtubules which 
are the protein skeletal structures within neurons provide two or more image states that exist in 
quantum coherence (superposition) with each other; in this state of pre-conscious superposition 
there exists a number of possibilities which collapse into an objective reality when a choice is 
made. Due to the problem of the conscious perception occurring after we have responded to it, 
consciousness has been seen as illusory. However the evidence from quantum mechanics and 
from backward time effects in the brain suggest that quantum state reduction in Orch OR can send 
quantum information back in time in the order of hundreds of milliseconds. Under the effects of 
quantum gravity the moment of choice causes a bulge in the space-time fabric to the smallest 
possible measure on the Planck scale of 10-33 cm. 
This rescues consciousness from being epiphenomenal by providing feedback loops through 
axonal firings that occur in real time when a conscious choice is made. They argue that if the 
universe is unfolding rather than human actions occurring due to algorithmic processes, then free 
will and agency becomes possible; moreover they argue that their theory is testable and compatible 
with neuroscience and physics. 
Mind, matter and ethics; implications for criminology 
Paul Cilliers (Cilliers, 1998, 2005) argues that complexity theory reveals both the limits of our 
knowledge and also the irreducibility of meaning but in a non-relativistic way. This limitation is 
brought about because we inhabit the systems that we study and therefore we can have no 
absolute and objective knowledge of our lived experience. Meaning and knowledge is contingent 
and contextual and because it cannot be represented and the context is not transparent we have 
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to choose our hermeneutical frameworks and therefore we cannot escape what is ethical or 
normative. With respect to both complexity theory and Bohm’s work on quantum mechanics we 
are all co-constitutive of each other’s lived experience and therefore have shared responsibility for 
each other (see Bartollas (2014) for a discussion in respect of peacemaking and constitutive 
criminologies).  
For Bohm (see Bohm, 1968) the implicate order reveals the potential for creativity to social 
problems whereas the mechanised approach to the universe and the consequent lack of an 
approach to consciousness and mind has induced at best confusion and at worst a lack of 
awareness or being in a state of sleep. However Bohm’s work supports much that is progressive 
within criminal justice practice and rehabilitative social work more broadly. The connectedness of 
complex systems can lead to constructive change whereas mechanistic approaches to crime, 
punishment and social problems reduces possibilities for change through closing down the phase 
space.  
This closing down of possibilities within the phase space is best evidenced by the historical 
selection of a utilitarian version of teleological ethics in politics and economics emphasising the 
free and calculating individual engaged in the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. In this 
Newtonian clockwork universe the rational, atomised, isolated individual in a state of nature 
consents with other people to create order; these powerful myths drive the development of 
liberalism, democracy, human rights, enlightenment, science, humanism, and criminal justice.  The 
consequences for criminal justice (and social policy more broadly) gives rise to the principle of less 
eligibility.  This principle in asserting that if imprisonment is to act as a deterrent then the treatment 
given a prisoner should not be greater than that provided to a member of the least significant class 
in the free society imposes an identity on the poor. The utilitarian argument that the principle is 
necessary to combat human nature while providing incentives to work (see Sieh, 1989) reaches 
its denouement over the gates of Auschwitz "Arbeit macht frei" (Work will set you free). In 
contemporary justice Carlen for example (2015) has been highly critical of the ways in which the 
class bias effect of less eligibility returns poorer disadvantaged lawbreakers to their place and 
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keeps richer more powerful criminals in theirs, and so undermines any advances. Also the platonic 
implication of the ‘re’  in rehabilitation suggests a return to a desirable place/state which is clearly 
not the case for the majority of criminals (notwithstanding the problem of the arrow of time). More 
over economic disadvantage is used to economic advantage with prison building, the out sourcing 
of functions for surveillance and rehabilitation being used to stimulate local economies (see e.g. 
Blakely, 2005). The principle as applied to the Work House now applies to prison (and to 
community sentences where it is more often referred to as ‘less superiority) whereby the prisoners 
or those on community sentences should not receive a standard of lifestyle or services superior to 
a non-criminal. 
Current approaches to statistically based ‘frequentist’ risk management approaches further 
contribute to the locking in of retribution and the failures of rehabilitation precisely because these 
approaches mean that for an individual who has committed a crime the slate cannot be wiped 
clean because of what they might do in the future requiring information to remain on file.5 Consider 
the following scenario outlined by a trainee probation officer in England (Clare Robson, 2015:25) 
when discussing a case that she is supervising in the community: 
“I have…used my sessions with Stan6 to explore his view about identity, boundaries and what 
situations he finds challenging…it was clear…that he identified himself as a rapper, and a 
successful upcoming rapper as well. His pride and motivation was evident in his language and 
recollection of various projects he has worked and the positive feedback he was receiving. Twice 
during supervision he burst into song, ‘spitting’ his new lyrics to give me a flavour of the type of 
music he was making. His confidence in his identity and ability clearly gave him the type of ‘hope’ 
that (desistance theory) suggests offers an offender a stake in their future and increases 
desistance. In relation to risk registration and assessments probation policy recognises the serious 
risk of harm posed by perpetrators of domestic violence and as such offenders like Stan are 
                                                          
5 Interestingly Bayes Theorem is a highly reputable risk assessment method based on conditional probabilities 
rather than frequentism and  that will allow for a deleting of prior information once this is deemed not 
relevant to the situation. See Jennings (2014). 
6Not real name 
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automatically registered as Medium Risk of Harm at the very least. They cannot be reduced to low 
risk during the currency of their Order. This poses an ethical dilemma, whereby I expect Stan to 
demonstrate change but cannot mirror the change to him with a review of his risk. I effectively 
label him as Medium Risk no matter what he achieves. He successfully completed a domestic 
abuse programme with excellent feedback from his tutors, he demonstrated a high level of 
remorse and ended the abusive relationship, but I am still duty bound to keep him registered as 
Medium Risk.” 
The justification for this approach as Robson points out, is the consequences of a risk-averse and 
instrumentalist organisational culture which means that should further offences occur then at least 
the professional (or rather in these cases the organisation) has demonstrated defensible decision 
making with respect to the individual concerned. Robson goes onto argue that individual aspiration 
and potential needed to be routinely worked with and rewarded throughout the supervision of the 
order, so as to provide the foundations of hope. This an excellent example of the ways in which 
constructive aspects of rehabilitation are routinely undermined by the wider processes of less 
eligibility and risk and do not allow for a positive projection of potential for the individual either to 
themselves or to the wider community7.  
The evolutionary nature of complex adaptive systems reveals that change can never be 
retrospective; we can achieve some sense of equilibrium in the phase space (but see the 
discussion by Needs and Adair-Stantiall (2017) on the fragility of these states) which allows us to 
function (potentially through quantum brain biology) relative to the arrow of time however we need 
to return to Gödel and the problem of not being able to access the Platonic realm of objective 
knowledge. I am arguing that we access new dynamical states (the provision of energy, resources 
and creativity) through understanding not just that there is no distinction between mind and matter 
but that the processes of evolution give themselves to us as we emerge with them and feedback 
into them in the process of becoming. The work of Jean-Luc Marion is particularly insightful here 
                                                          
7 For a discussion of the uses of complexity theory, continental philosophy and hermeneutics with respect to 
forgiveness as an opening up of phase spaces and the creation of new dynamical states see Pycroft and 
Bartollas (forthcoming). 
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especially his phenomenology of givenness (Marion, 2002) where he argues that “what shows 
itself first gives itself (emphasis retained) (Marion, 2002:5). He argues the priority of 
phenomenology to allow phenomena to reveal themselves and to counter any metaphysics by 
“recognizing, the meaning that the phenomenon itself gives from itself and to itself” (Marion, 
2002:9).  
Interestingly what happens though developing Gödel’s logic and applying complexity theory and 
insights from phenomenology is the finding that arguments about determinism versus 
constructivism are outmoded because our understanding of the activities of phase spaces relative 
to the arrow of time, constituted by mind-matter relationships changes our understanding of what 
is deterministic and what is socially constructed. 
These insights have profound implications for our understanding and practices of criminal justice 
given its fundamental concern with the arrow of time; past (the crime), present (exercise of justice 
and acquittal or punishment), future (limits of punishment and potential rehabilitation). To carry 
Marion’s argument further (and based upon his conversation with Kearney (Kearney, 2016:188) I 
would argue that our concern is not with the essence of the implicate order but more “a matter of 
decision and response, not thought and proposition. Of event rather than of being and essence.” 
In this sense a crime is an event within the context of the arrow of time that changes the trajectory 
of different phase spaces of the actors and networks involved; furthermore the processes of justice 
have to acknowledge the past and in an evolutionary sense the past makes us who we are, but not 
necessarily who we are to become. 
Conclusion 
Developments in our understanding of the relationships between matter and consciousness over 
the last 100 years have been profound with respect to the Newtonian paradigm, relativity and 
quantum mechanics with many of those relationships remaining unclear. Complexity theory has 
emerged from the positivism of chaos theory but as with other areas there have been significant 
developments in our understanding of non-linearity and particularly the non-linear nature of social 
life. The more recent developments in understanding complexity have looked to Bohmian 
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mechanics and the concept of implicate order to understand the ways in which mind and matter 
are co-constituted with reality having a structure that is “enfolded within and therefore available to 
human experience” (Nichol, 2003:5) meaning that we are active participants rather than detached 
observers. The implications for social research are profound, exciting and challenging with some 
fields (including criminological research) having barely got to grips with complexity theory itself, or 
having done so from (sometimes unwittingly) a positivist perspective. In modestly advancing 
arguments by stepping out and following the logic of positivism itself as it applies to complexity 
theory it is hoped that there will be an ongoing dialogue that moves us out of our ontological and 
epistemological silos. Complexity theory as an approach and particularly the concepts of complex 
adaptive systems and strange attractors in conjunction with David Bohm’s work I argue provide us 
with a heuristic that allows for such a debate which is ultimately one of moral choice. 
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